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I INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the High Court of Australia dismissed an appeal by Robert Fardon, a 
prisoner at the Wolston Correctional Centre in suburban Brisbane, by upholding 
the validity of Queensland’s Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 
(Qld) (‘DPSOA’).1 Subsequently, Fardon instructed the Prisoners’ Legal Service 
of Queensland to initiate a communication (‘the Fardon communication’) to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’),2 contending that the DPSOA 
is inconsistent with the double jeopardy provision contained in art 14(7) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.3 
It is not unusual to incarcerate offenders for terms longer than those which 
may otherwise be imposed, as a ‘preventive’ measure designed to protect the 
community. Such forms of imprisonment are generally referred to as ‘preventive 
detention’ schemes.4 However, the DPSOA is unique because it authorises the 
reincarceration of a sex offender who has served his or her term of 
imprisonment, but is judged by a court to represent a risk to the community if 
released. The key legal question that arises is whether re-imprisonment 
constitutes a ‘second’ imprisonment and, accordingly, double punishment for the 
initial offence. 
This commentary argues that the DPSOA breaches the ICCPR provision on 
double jeopardy. It advances the view that the Fardon communication, which is 
currently before the HRC, is a critical test case of art 14(7). First, the 
commentary explores the historical debate surrounding preventive detention in 
Australia. Against this backdrop, the commentary considers three examples of 
preventive detention adopted by Australian states. In particular, the commentary 
will examine the DPSOA, revealing the unique nature of the legislation. The 
operation of the DPSOA in practice will be considered through an assessment of 
the High Court’s approach in Fardon. Further, the commentary analyses the 
jurisprudence of the HRC and the central problems and issues concerning 
preventive detention. Here, it will be demonstrated that although imprisonment 
can be lawfully ordered for ostensibly ‘non-punitive’ purposes under the 
DPSOA, such imprisonment is plainly punitive and in breach of the ICCPR. It is 
argued that the HRC is likely to share this view when it considers the Fardon 
communication. 
                                                 
 1 Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 210 ALR 50 (‘Fardon’). At the time of writing, 
Lyons J of the Supreme Court of Queensland had recently ordered that Fardon be released 
on a supervision order. This event is not likely to affect the status of Fardon’s 
communication to the Human Rights Committee. 
 2 Interview with Susan Bothmann, Coordinator, Prisoners’ Legal Service (Telephone 
interview, 12 October 2006). 
 3 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 
1976) (‘ICCPR’).  
 4 See, eg, Stephen Smallbone and Janet Ransley, ‘Legal and Psychological Controversies in 
the Preventive Incapacitation of Sexual Offenders’ (2005) 28 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 299; Rozanna Zalewski, ‘Preventive Detention: Justified or Justice 
Denied?’ (1992) 66 Law Institute Journal 1008. On preventive detention regimes outside 
Australia, see Jess Vames, ‘Preventive Detention versus Civil Commitment: Alternative 
Policies for Public Protection in New Zealand and California’ (2005) 12 Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law 357. 
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II PREVENTIVE DETENTION LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIA 
A The History of the Debate 
The debate regarding preventive detention in Australia is not new. 
Historically, such detention has found few, if any, supporters beyond party 
politics. Almost a decade ago, a briefing paper to the New South Wales 
Parliament entitled Dangerous Offenders Legislation addressed the fundamental 
aspects of preventive detention.5 Its authors noted that while there exists a small 
number of ‘career’ violent offenders who do present a continuing risk,  
[t]here are relatively few offenders who are ‘dangerous’ in the sense that they 
pose a continuing real danger of serious harm to members of the public. Most 
serious crimes against the person are committed by people who have not 
previously offended, and most offenders convicted of violent offences do not 
repeat their crimes.6 
As Walker notes, while dangerous offender legislation commonly contains lists 
of crimes that arguably qualify for sentencing with a predictive component, there 
have been very few attempts to articulate in any coherent manner the principles 
upon which these selections are based.7 
Preventive detention sits uncomfortably with the notions that the punishment 
must be proportionate to the crime and that the liberty of the individual is 
sacrosanct.8 Imprisonment for what a person is likely to do is, by its very 
essence, predictive of what may or may not occur in the future.9 Since there 
exists the possibility that a predicted offence may never occur, which renders any 
consideration of the proportionality of the response meaningless, preventive 
detention is always an extraordinary step to take. Furthermore, since the logic of 
preventive detention is that a detainee has the potential to offend if released, the 
concept permits indefinite detention so long as the detainer is able to ‘prove’ that 
the detainee has the potential to meet the detainer’s predictions of what the 
detainee will do. But what constitutes acceptable, cogent evidence of 
‘dangerousness’?10 By its very nature, preventive detention allows for 
imprisonment of ‘criminal types’, rather than imprisonment for criminal 
conduct.11 
Moreover, since preventive detention permits the continuation of 
incarceration after an offender has served his or her prescribed sentence, it has 
                                                 
 5 Honor Figgis and Rachel Simpson, ‘Dangerous Offenders Legislation: An Overview’ 
(Briefing Paper No 14/97, Parliament of New South Wales, Australia, 1997), available  
at <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/7B7EEA210A63B3 
1CCA256ECF0008CB87> at 1 October 2006.  
 6 Ibid. 
 7 Nigel Walker (ed), Dangerous People (1996) 10. 
 8 See, eg, The Magna Carta, signed in 1215, arts 20, 21. 
 9 See Bernadette McSherry, ‘Indefinite and Preventive Detention Legislation: From Caution 
to an Open Door’ (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 94, 94–8. See also R v Moffatt [1998] 2 
VR 229, challenging, inter alia, the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 18. 
 10 For a telling critique of the ‘science’ of contemporary approaches to risk prediction in this 
context see Terence Campbell, ‘Sex Offenders and Actuarial Risk Assessments: Ethical 
Considerations’ (2003) 21 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 269. 
 11 Bernadette McSherry, ‘Terrorism Offences in the Criminal Code: Broadening the 
Boundaries of Australian Criminal Laws’ (2004) 27 UNSW Law Journal 354, 364. 
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the consequence of punishing an offender twice for the same offence. Of course, 
this issue turns on whether preventive detention is punitive in character, which is 
considered later in this commentary.12  
Irrespective of the merits or flaws of preventive detention, it remains a 
politically attractive tool for any government in search of avenues in the criminal 
justice system within which to deal with perceptions of continuing criminal 
behaviour. Preventive detention law is an ostensible demonstration to the 
electorate that the government is taking serious measures to protect the 
community against crime.  
B Preventive Detention in Practice  
The effective management of repeat offenders has been a persistent challenge 
for criminal justice systems in all Australian jurisdictions.13 Prior to the most 
recent wave of ‘preventive detention’ reforms,14 indefinite sentencing regimes 
were adopted. Under these regimes, courts were allowed to consider the 
offender’s behaviour during incarceration and responses to rehabilitation efforts 
as part of determining his or her suitability for release.15 However, these reforms 
do not appear to have satisfied a number of prominent and vocal advocates of 
preventive detention,16 who have captured the attention of a number of state 
governments.17 As a result, the political desire to appear to have responded to 
periodic media reports of paedophilia and other types of serious sexual crime has 
hastened the pace of legislative experimentation.18 If an offender can be 
incarcerated indefinitely after a trial, then why not reincarcerate the offender 
                                                 
 12 See below Part III(C)(2). 
 13 See C R Williams, ‘Coping with the Highly Dangerous: Issues of Principle Raised by 
Preventive Detention’ in Sally-Anne Gerull and William Lucas (eds), Serious Violent 
Offenders: Sentencing, Psychiatry and Law Reform: Proceedings of a Conference Held  
29–31 October 1991 (1993) 11. 
 14 The most recent Australian examples of preventive detention schemes have arisen in the 
context of terrorism: see Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW) s 26D; Terrorism 
(Preventative Detention) Act 2005 (SA) s 6; Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003 
(Vic) s 13E. These regimes generally go a step further than the DPSOA, authorising 
detention to prevent a terrorist act, even when the detainee has not been charged with an 
offence. 
 15 See, eg, McSherry, ‘Indefinite and Preventive Detention Legislation’, above n 9; R v Moffatt 
[1998] 2 VR 229. See also Felman v Law Institute of Victoria (1997) 142 FLR 362. 
 16 Perhaps the most prominent advocate of the expansion of reincarceration schemes is Hetty 
Johnson, who, in a radio interview, said: ‘What’s happening here is we’re just pussyfooting 
around. If what we’re trying to do is to protect the community, protect innocent children, 
then let’s do it. And if that means turning the law on its head, then let’s do that too’: ABC 
Radio National, The Law Report, 9 November 2004, available at <http://www.abc.net.au/ 
rn/lawreport/stories/2004/1236821.htm#> at 1 October 2006 (emphasis added). 
 17 The increasingly extreme rhetoric from both sides of state politics regarding sexual and 
violent criminals is outlined in George Zdenkowski, ‘Punishment Policy and Politics’ in 
Martin Laffin and Martin Painter (eds), Reform and Reversal: Lessons from the Coalition 
Government in New South Wales 1988–1995 (1995) 220. 
 18 This is evidenced by the quick succession of sexual offender legislation introduced across 
Australian jurisdictions: see, eg, Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) and Community 
Protection Act 1990 (Vic). Other jurisdictions subsequently considered options for the 
sentencing of serious offenders: see, eg, David Biles, Consultant Criminologist and 
Professorial Associate, Charles Sturt University, Sentence and Release Options for  
High-Risk Sexual Offenders (2005) <http://www.jcs.act.gov.au/eLibrary/OtherReports/ 
Biles%20Report.pdf> at 1 October 2006. 
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after the completion of the sentence where there is a perception that the offender 
has the potential to reoffend? 
1 Victorian Case Study: Garry David 
The earliest attempt to introduce this particular type of preventive detention 
was made in Victoria with the introduction of the Community Protection Act 
1990 (Vic).19 The Victorian Act was passed specifically to detain Garry David 
after his term of imprisonment had expired.20 David, who had been convicted of 
two counts of attempted murder in 1980, had a long history of threatening 
behaviour.21 As his sentence approached its end in 1990, there was palpable 
community concern that he might reoffend.22 The Act empowered the Supreme 
Court to order David’s preventive detention in a psychiatric in-patient service, 
prison or other institution for up to six months if the Court was satisfied that, on 
the balance of probabilities, he was a serious risk to the safety of any member of 
the public and was likely to commit any act of personal violence upon another 
person.23 Upon subsequent application by the Attorney-General, detention orders 
were made. In 1993, David died in custody. 
2 New South Wales Case Study: Gregory Kable 
In 1994, the New South Wales Government believed that it faced a problem 
similar to that encountered in Victoria. Gregory Kable had been convicted and 
sentenced to prison for the manslaughter of his wife. While serving his sentence, 
Kable had written threatening letters which prompted serious concern that upon 
his release he would present a danger to those to whom he had made threats.24 
The NSW Parliament enacted the Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW). 
Unlike the Victorian legislation, the NSW Act was intended to apply generally. 
However, after parliamentary debate over the Bill, its application was confined 
specifically to Kable. The NSW Act provided for Kable to be detained following 
the expiry of his scheduled sentence for up to six months, by order of the NSW 
Supreme Court on the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions.25 The 
Court had to be satisfied on reasonable grounds that Kable was more likely than 
not to commit a ‘serious act of violence’ and that it was appropriate for the 
protection of a particular person or persons or the community generally that he 
                                                 
 19 See David Wood, ‘A One Man Dangerous Offenders Statute — The Community Protection 
Act 1990 (Vic)’ (1989) 17 Melbourne University Law Review 497, 497; C R Williams, 
‘Psychopathy, Mental Illness and Preventive Detention: Issues Arising from the David 
Case’ (1990) 16 Monash University Law Review 161, 175; Paul Ames Fairall, ‘Violent 
Offenders and Community Protection in Victoria — The Garry David Experience’ (1993) 
17 Criminal Law Journal 40, 42. 
 20 Community Protection Act 1990 (Vic) s 1. 
 21 Attorney-General v David [1992] 2 VR 46, 49–53. 
 22 See, eg, Paul Wilson, ‘Why This Man Must Not Be Freed’, The Herald Sun (Melbourne, 
Australia), 18 April 1990, 10.  
 23 Community Protection Act 1990 (Vic) s 8. 
 24 See Elizabeth Jurman, ‘Special Law May Keep Killer in Jail’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney, Australia), 25 October 1994, 3.  
 25 Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) s 5. 
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be held in custody.26 As a result of the legislation, which was plainly designed to 
ensure his continued incarceration, Kable was ordered to return to prison.27 
In 1996, the High Court declared that the NSW Act was constitutionally 
invalid.28 The Court found that the Act imposed functions on the Supreme Court 
that were incompatible with the exercise of federal judicial power.29 As a result, 
preventive detention legislation appeared to be destined for the history books — 
that is, until the Queensland Parliament enacted the DPSOA.  
3 Queensland Example: The DPSOA  
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the DPSOA was enacted in 
response to  
growing community concern about the release of convicted sex offenders, not 
only because of the abhorrent nature of these offences, but because of the lack of 
evidence that some offenders have been rehabilitated, after refusing to participate 
in sexual offender treatment programs.30 
Section 3 of the DPSOA articulates the objectives of the legislation:  
(a) to provide for the continued detention in custody or supervised release of a 
particular class of prisoner to ensure adequate protection of the community; 
and 
(b) to provide continuing control, care or treatment of a particular class of 
prisoner to facilitate their rehabilitation. 
The DPSOA entered into force on 6 June 2003, three days after it was introduced 
into the unicameral Queensland Parliament. The DPSOA authorises the Supreme 
Court of Queensland to order post-sentence imprisonment of persons serving 
sentences for serious sexual offences where the Attorney-General has made an 
application pursuant to ss 5 and 8.31 The Court must be satisfied that there are 
                                                 
 26 Community Protection Act 1994 (NSW) s 5(2). 
 27 See Anabel Dean, ‘Kable Too Dangerous to Release, Judge Rules’, The Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney, Australia), 31 December 1994, 6. 
 28 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
 29 See also Peter Hanks, Patrick Keyzer and Jennifer Clarke, Australian Constitutional Law: 
Materials and Commentary (7th ed, 2004) 427–36; Patrick Keyzer, ‘Liberty Is Dead: To 
What End the Separation of Judicial Power of the Commonwealth?’ (Paper presented at the 
National Conference of the Australian Association of Constitutional Law, Sydney, 
Australia, 27 November 2004); Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Kable Doctrine and State Legislative 
Power over State Courts’ (2005) 20(2) Australasian Parliamentary Review 15; Dan 
Meagher, ‘The Status of the Kable Principle in Australian Constitutional Law’ (2005) 16 
Public Law Review 182, 186–7; Anthony Gray, ‘Standard of Proof, Unpredictable 
Behaviour and the High Court of Australia’s Verdict on Preventive Detention Laws’ (2005) 
10 Deakin Law Review 177, 179–83. 
 30 Explanatory Memorandum, Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Bill 2003 (Qld) 1. 
 31 Section 5 of the DPSOA provides that the application be made during the last six months of 
the prisoner’s period of imprisonment (s 5(2)(c)). A ‘prisoner’ is defined as ‘a prisoner 
detained in custody who is serving a period of imprisonment for a serious sexual offence, or 
serving a period of imprisonment that includes a term of imprisonment for a serious sexual 
offence, whether the person was sentenced to the term or period of imprisonment before or 
after the commencement of this section’ (s 5(6)). Section 8 provides that the Court may 
order that the prisoner undergo examinations ‘by 2 psychiatrists named by the court who are 
to prepare independent reports’ (s 8(2)(a)); or, if the court is satisfied the application may 
not be finally decided until after the prisoner’s release day, order ‘that the prisoner be 
detained in custody for the period stated in the order’ (s 8(2)(b)). 
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reasonable grounds for believing that there is an unacceptable risk that the 
prisoner will commit a serious sexual offence if released from custody.32 A 
serious sexual offence is defined in the DPSOA as ‘an offence of a sexual nature 
against children or involving violence whether committed in Queensland or 
outside Queensland’.33 
Importantly, a person subject to a continuing detention order made pursuant to 
s 13 remains a prisoner despite the expiry of the original sentence.34 Such an 
order constitutes a warrant committing the prisoner into custody for the purposes 
of the Corrective Services Act 2000 (Qld) (‘CSA’).35 Furthermore, a person who 
is the subject of an order made pursuant to s 13 of the DPSOA is not eligible for 
post-prison community-based release programs under the CSA.36 
III THE DPSOA IN OPERATION: THE FARDON CASE  
A The Offences 
Fardon’s criminal history dates from 12 February 1965 when he was 16 years 
old, and comprises mostly minor property and other non-violent offences.37 
However, Fardon has also been convicted of three serious sexual offences. In 
1967, 18 year old Fardon was convicted of attempted carnal knowledge of a girl 
under 10 years of age.38 He was placed on a bond.39 In 1979, he was convicted of 
indecent dealing with a female under 14 years, rape and unlawful wounding.40 
He was sentenced to serve 12 months, 13 years and six months respectively for 
these offences.41 Less than three weeks after his release from prison, Fardon was 
convicted of rape, sodomy and assault occasioning actual bodily harm in relation 
to an adult woman.42 The sentence commenced on 30 June 1989 and expired on 
29 June 2003.43 
                                                 
 32 Section 13 provides that if a prisoner is considered to be a serious danger to the community, 
the court may impose a continuing detention order pursuant to which the prisoner may be 
detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care or treatment (s 13(5)(a)). A 
prisoner is a serious danger to the community if there is an unacceptable risk that they will 
commit a serious sexual offence if released from custody or released without a supervision 
order being made (s 13(2)(a), (b)). In determining whether a prisoner is a serious danger to 
the community, the court must consider: the prisoner’s criminal history, medical, 
psychological and psychiatric assessments relating to the prisoner, the prisoner’s propensity 
to commit serious sexual offences in the future and the prisoner’s participation in 
rehabilitation programs (s 13(4)). In deciding whether to make an order, the paramount 
consideration is given to the need to ensure adequate protection of the community (s 13(6)). 
The Attorney-General has the onus of proving that there is a high probability that, if 
released, the prisoner would be a serious danger to the community (s 13(7)). 
 33 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) sch 1. 
 34 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) s 14(1)(a). 
 35 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) s 50. 
 36 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) s 51. 
 37 Attorney-General (Qld) v Fardon [2003] QSC 331 (Unreported, Atkinson J, 2 October 
2003) [36]. 
 38 Ibid [35]. 
 39 Ibid. 
 40 Ibid [37]. 
 41 Ibid. 
 42 Ibid [38]. 
 43 Ibid. 
 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 7 
 
B The Subsequent Proceedings 
On 17 June 2003, shortly before Fardon’s release from prison, Queensland 
Attorney-General Rod Welford filed an originating application under s 5 of the 
DPSOA for an order that Fardon be detained in custody for an indefinite period. 
After a series of detention orders, Fardon was reimprisoned under the ‘annual 
review’ provisions of the DPSOA in May 2005.44 
Meanwhile, constitutional challenges to the validity of the DPSOA progressed 
through the courts. On 9 July 2003, Muir J held that s 8 of the DPSOA was 
constitutionally valid.45 On 23 September 2003, the Queensland Court of Appeal 
then held that ss 8 and 13 were constitutionally valid.46 Finally, on 1 October 
2004, the High Court of Australia dismissed Fardon’s constitutional challenge.47 
C Does the DPSOA Inflict Double Punishment? 
In his submission to the High Court, Fardon argued that the DPSOA imposes 
double punishment because it allows a judge of the Supreme Court of 
Queensland to order the imprisonment of someone convicted and sentenced for a 
criminal offence, who has satisfied the penalty imposed at sentence, without 
proof of further criminal guilt.48 The double punishment effect of the DPSOA is 
reinforced when one bears in mind that a Court making an order under the 
DPSOA is required to have regard to the prior offences of a person in 
determining whether he should continue to be a prisoner in circumstances where 
no new crime has been committed.49 Fardon contended that s 13(4)(c) and (d) 
reinforce the conclusion that the DPSOA punishes a person for his or her prior 
offences. Fardon’s continued imprisonment is punishment because, by virtue of 
the operation of ss 8 and 13, he is a prisoner. Fardon argued that he is subject to 
substantially the same imprisonment regime as if he were convicted of a criminal 
offence.  
1 The High Court’s Response 
All of the principal threads of Fardon’s submission were dismissed by the 
majority.50 Despite the potential implications of preventive detention for double 
jeopardy, only Gummow and Kirby JJ addressed the issue. Gummow J noted:  
It is accepted that the common law value expressed by the term ‘double jeopardy’ 
applies not only to determination of guilt or innocence, but also to the 
quantification of punishment. However, the making of a continuing detention 
                                                 
 44 For a detailed analysis of the progression of the case, see Patrick Keyzer, Stephen 
Southwood and Cathy Pereira, ‘Pre-Emptive Imprisonment for Dangerousness in 
Queensland under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003: The 
Constitutional Issues’ (2004) 11 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 244. 
 45 Attorney-General (Qld) v Fardon [2003] QSC 200 (Unreported, Muir J, 9 July 2003). 
 46 Attorney-General (Qld) v Fardon [2003] QCA 416 (Unreported, de Jersey CJ, McMurdo P 
and Williams JA, 23 September 2003). 
 47 Fardon (2004) 210 ALR 50. 
 48 Attorney-General (Qld) v Fardon [2003] QCA 416 (Unreported, de Jersey CJ, McMurdo P 
and Williams JA, 23 September 2003) [80] (McMurdo P). 
 49 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) s 13(3)(g). 
 50 Fardon (2004) 210 ALR 50 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and  
Heydon JJ, Kirby J dissenting). 
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order with effect after expiry of the term for which the appellant was sentenced in 
1989 did not punish him twice, or increase his punishment for the offences of 
which he had been convicted.51 
Central to his Honour’s observation is the assertion that double jeopardy is not 
relevant to the DPSOA because preventive detention does not amount to being 
punished twice nor constitute an increase in the punishment originally imposed 
on the offender. In reaching this conclusion, his Honour referred to the reasoning 
of the House of Lords in R (Giles) v Parole Board,52 in which their Lordships 
drew a distinction between deprivation of liberty for an indeterminate term 
imposed by a court order and that imposed by an administrative decision. In 
Giles, it was held that a sentence imposed by an English court for a longer period 
than would be commensurate with the severity of the proven offences did not 
attract the operation of art 5(4) of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.53 Article 5(4) provides that ‘everyone who 
is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily 
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful’. 
Kirby J approached the double punishment question from a different 
perspective. In contrast to Gummow J, Kirby J found that preventive detention 
amounted to both an increase in punishment and a new punishment for the 
original offence.54 Furthermore, his Honour argued that ‘the influence of [the 
ICCPR] upon Australian law is large, immediate and bound to increase, 
particularly in statutory construction’.55 By implication, Kirby J argued that the 
values of the ICCPR must inform the construction of statutes. Accordingly, he 
noted that 
the [DPSOA] ultimately deprives people such as the appellant of personal liberty, 
a most fundamental human right, on a prediction of dangerousness, based largely 
on the opinions of psychiatrists which can only be, at best, an educated or 
informed ‘guess’.56  
Ultimately, his Honour concluded that ‘[r]etrospective application of new 
criminal offences and of additional punishment is offensive to the fundamental 
tenets of our law. It is also contrary to the obligations assumed by Australia 
under the ICCPR’.57 The international aspects of his Honour’s decision will be 
considered below. 
2 Is Preventive Detention in a Prison Necessarily Punitive? 
The analysis of preventive detention in Fardon demonstrates that the issue 
turns on whether preventive detention can be properly characterised as 
                                                 
 51 Fardon (2004) 210 ALR 50, 72 (citations omitted). 
 52 [2004] 1 AC 1, 25–34 (Lord Hope of Craighead), 38–45 (Lord Hutton) (Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill, Lord Steyn and Lord Scott of Foscote agreeing at 20, 21 and 45 respectively) 
(‘Giles’). 
 53 Opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 
1953) (‘European Convention’); Giles [2004] 1 AC 1, 8. 
 54 Fardon (2004) 210 ALR 50, 100 (Kirby J). 
 55 Ibid (citation omitted). 
 56 Ibid 82 (citation omitted). 
 57 Fardon (2004) 210 ALR 50, 101 (Kirby J). 
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‘punitive’. As this commentary has argued, the form of preventive detention 
conceived by the DPSOA is punitive in character. This view finds substantial 
support in international human rights standards and various decisions of foreign 
courts and tribunals.58 
As Gummow J cited the House of Lords decision in Giles in support of his 
view that preventive detention is not punitive,59 our analysis commences with an 
assessment of this decision. Giles pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at 
Nottingham to two offences committed on different occasions.60 On 10 January 
1997, he was sentenced to consecutive terms of four and three years’ 
imprisonment.61 In sentencing, the judge observed that it was necessary to pass a 
custodial sentence which was longer than the sentence that would be 
commensurate with the seriousness of the offences, in order to protect the  
public — and one of Giles’ victims in particular — from serious harm by him.62 
As a result, Giles’ sentence incorporated a preventive element. Giles appealed on 
the basis that the preventive element of his sentence constituted ‘arbitrary 
detention’ because ‘he did not have the right, after he had served the punitive 
part of his sentence, to apply to a court to decide whether it was still necessary to 
detain him in order to protect the public’.63  
In his appeal, Giles contended that the preventive aspect of his detention 
violated art 5(4) of the European Convention. His counsel submitted that  
[t]o prevent arbitrary detention the court can only authorise detention in the 
preventative phase as long as the offender continues to pose a danger. The 
lawfulness of detention falls to be re-determined in accordance with article 5(4) 
by reference to the question of ongoing dangerousness as soon as the punitive 
phase ceases to govern detention, and by reason of the changeable quality of 
dangerousness, at reasonable intervals thereafter.64 
It is significant that in Giles, there was no application made after the appellant 
had served his sentence. Rather, the case was decided after Giles had been 
released on licence. Nevertheless, the Court decided to hear the appeal because it 
raised ‘an important point of principle’,65 namely, whether the imposition at the 
time of conviction of a sentence longer than is ‘commensurate with the 
seriousness’ of a person’s crime is consistent with art 5(4). In examining the 
issue, Lord Hope cited the view of the European Commission for Human Rights 
that ‘[s]uch an “increased” sentence is … no more than the usual exercise by the 
sentencing court of its ordinary sentencing powers, even if the ‘increase’ has a 
statutory basis’.66 His Lordship thus concluded, as did the rest of the Court, that 
                                                 
 58 See, eg, Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525, where Brennan, Deane, Toohey and 
Gaudron JJ stated that: ‘Punishment is punishment, whether it is imposed in vindication or 
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 59 Fardon (2004) 210 ALR 50, 70. 
 60 Giles [2004] 1 AC 1, 6. 
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 62 Ibid 1. 
 63 Ibid 36. 
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 65 Ibid 19 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
 66 Mansell v United Kingdom, Application No 32072/96 (Unreported, European Court of 
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the longer than ‘commensurate’ sentence that was imposed on the appellant was 
not a violation of art 5(4). This view is supported by the jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court in Winterwerp v The Netherlands67 and in De Wilde, Ooms and 
Versyp v Belgium (No 1).68 However, this jurisprudence focuses on the initial 
conviction and not the subsequent issue of further detention without trial. This 
point is well made in Iribarne Pérez v France,69 where the Court stated:  
The review required by [art 5(4)] is incorporated in the decision depriving a 
person of his liberty when that decision is made by a court at the close of judicial 
proceedings; this is so, for example, where a sentence of imprisonment is 
pronounced after ‘conviction by a competent court’ within the meaning of  
[art 5(1)(a) of the European Convention]. Only the ‘initial decision’ is 
contemplated, not ‘an ensuing period of detention in which new issues affecting 
the lawfulness of the detention might subsequently arise’.70 
In considering judicial comment on the punitive nature of preventative 
detention under the European Convention, it is crucial to note that the issues 
raised in Fardon are fundamentally different from those in cases such as Giles. 
In Fardon, the issue was whether the application for and the imposition of a 
preventive sentence after the appellant had served his original sentence 
constituted a breach of his human rights. In light of the distinction that can be 
drawn between the facts in Giles and Fardon, the DPSOA, by permitting the 
detention of a person without further trial after they have served the original 
sentence, may well offend similar international laws relating to detention. 
Accordingly, this commentary now considers whether the DPSOA breaches the 
ICCPR. 
IV ASSESSMENT AT INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the Fardon appeal, the majority of the High Court focussed its analysis on 
the constitutional questions arising in the case. With the exception of Kirby J, the 
Court paid scant attention to the fundamental international law issues. Questions 
that concern the impact of international law on the creation of Australian 
legislation are of great importance. The validity of any statute at international 
law cannot be determined solely by reference to the domestic legal system. 
Rather, it must ultimately be assessed by reference to international norms and 
standards. Significantly, the High Court’s decision does not render the DPSOA 
valid under international law. Instead, this issue will ultimately be determined by 
the HRC.  
A The ‘No Double Punishment’ Rule under International Law 
It is a fundamental maxim of the law that a person may not be punished twice 
for the same crime: nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.71 The rule against 
                                                 
 67 (1979) 33 Eur Court HR (ser A) 4; 2 EHRR 387. 
 68 (1971) 12 Eur Court HR (ser A) 6; 1 EHRR 373. 
 69 (1995) 325 Eur Court HR (ser A) 48; 22 EHRR 153. 
 70 Ibid 63; 173–4. 
 71 See Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251, 273 (Deane and Gaudron JJ); Pearce v The 
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double punishment is a feature of numerous municipal legal systems.72 It may be 
classified, in the language of art 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, as a general principle of law ‘recognized by civilised nations’.  
Article 14(7) of the ICCPR provides that ‘[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or 
punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or 
acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country’. 
States parties to the ICCPR are obliged to comply with this prohibition. 
Furthermore, art 9(1) of the ICCPR provides that  
[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty 
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established 
by law.  
There are few examples of states parties to the ICCPR whose domestic 
legislation contradicts art 14(7). As such, Queensland’s DPSOA, and similar 
legislation enacted in other Australian states referred to above, represent a novel 
set of circumstances for the HRC to consider.73 Where states have breached the 
rule, those breaches have normally arisen from legislation that purported to serve 
an ulterior administrative or other non-punitive detention purpose. In such 
instances, the victim or prisoner retains the right to redress within the limits of 
the municipal legal system. However, the difficulty with seeking this redress is 
that invariably, as in Fardon’s case, the legislation authorising the incarceration 
is deemed to be valid.  
B The First Optional Protocol: The Avenue for Redress 
The avenue by which Fardon may obtain the HRC’s assessment of the 
DPSOA lies in the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,74 which enables an 
applicant to file a communication with the Committee, which oversees the 
ICCPR. Through this mechanism, Fardon can test the consistency of the DPSOA 
with the rule against double punishment in art 14(7). States parties to the First 
Optional Protocol recognise the competence of the HRC ‘to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant’.75 Australia ratified the First Optional Protocol in September 1991. 
Rule 90 of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee provides 
strict guidelines for the admissibility of communications.76 For a communication 
to be admissible, a Working Group of the Committee must be satisfied that, 
amongst other things, ‘the individual has exhausted all available domestic 
remedies’.77 The ‘local remedies’ rule is particularly relevant to the Fardon 
communication because it regards all local remedies as having been exhausted 
                                                 
 72 Green v United States, 355 US 184, 187–8 (1957) (United States); R v Shubley [1990] 1 
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 75 Ibid art 1. 
 76 HRC, Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/3/Rev.6  
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where the highest domestic judicial authority determines that the relevant 
legislation is legally valid, and there is an absence of any non-judicial 
intervention to provide a remedy. Therefore, the High Court’s decision 
constitutes the prerequisite that enables Fardon to pursue relief before the HRC.  
C The Comparative Strengths of Fardon’s Complaint 
1 The Precedent of the New Zealand Communication  
In order to demonstrate the relative strength of Fardon’s case, this 
commentary will now examine an analogous case involving preventive detention 
considered by the HRC in 2002. In that case, the complainants argued that their 
preventive detention sentences breached New Zealand’s obligations under the 
ICCPR.78 Mr Rameka, the first complainant, was found guilty of two charges of 
rape, one charge of aggravated burglary, one charge of assault with intent to 
commit rape, and one charge of indecent assault.79 Pre-sentence and psychiatric 
reports noted his ‘previous sexual offences, his propensity to commit sexual 
offences, his lack of remorse and his use of violence, concluding that that there 
was a 20% likelihood of further commission of sexual offences’.80 For the first 
count of rape, he was sentenced to preventive detention, which was to be served 
for 14 years concurrently with the second charge of rape. He was sentenced to 
two years’ imprisonment for the burglary and to two years’ imprisonment for the 
assault with intent to commit rape.81 
Mr Harris, the second complainant, pleaded guilty to, and was found guilty of, 
11 charges of sexual offences he had committed over a three month period 
against a minor.82 He had two prior convictions for unlawful sexual interference 
with minors.83 The Solicitor-General appealed his sentence on the basis that 
preventive detention, or at least a longer finite sentence, should have been 
imposed.84 In June 2000, the Court of Appeal agreed, and substituted a sentence 
of preventive detention in respect of each count. In imposing the sentence, the 
Court had noted that ‘no appropriate finite sentence would adequately protect the 
public, and that preventive detention, with its features of continuing supervision 
after release and amenability to recall, was the appropriate sentence’.85 
Mr Tarawa, the third complainant, was found guilty of a variety of charges 
including rape, ‘unlawful sexual connection’, indecent assault, burglary, 
aggravated burglary, kidnapping, being an accessory after the fact, aggravated 
robbery, demanding with menaces, and unlawfully entering a building.86 He had 
previous multiple offences involving breaking into homes and engaging in 
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 80 Ibid. 
 81 Ibid [2.2]. 
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sexually-motivated violence, including two rapes.87 Some of the offences were 
committed while Tarawa was on bail. He was sentenced to preventive detention 
in respect of the three sexual violation charges.88 On appeal, the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal held that in light of Tarawa’s criminal background, the 
preventive detention sentence was appropriately open to the sentencing judge.89 
In September 2001, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council rejected all 
three applications for special leave to appeal.90 The applicants subsequently 
applied to the HRC. Citing several authorities,91 they complained that 
it was arbitrary to impose a discretionary sentence on the basis of evidence of 
future dangerousness, as such a conclusion cannot satisfy the statutory tests of 
‘substantial risk of re-offending’ or ‘expedient for the protection of the public’ in 
the individual case. … [O]n the facts none of them fit the statutory tests of being a 
‘substantial risk’, [nor was] preventive detention … ‘expedient for protection of 
the public’.92 
2 Admissibility of Preventive Detention Complaints 
Before considering the merits of Fardon’s claim, the HRC must, in 
accordance with its Rules of Procedure, determine the admissibility of the 
communication.93 In this regard, the New Zealand communication may provide 
some guidance. In response to the complaint brought by Rameka, Harris and 
Tarawa, New Zealand argued, inter alia, that the claims were not admissible 
because the authors were not ‘victims’ pursuant to the definition in the First 
Optional Protocol.94 New Zealand argued that 
[w]hile the authors are currently serving sentences … they have not yet served the 
period that they would have had to serve had they been sentenced to a finite 
sentence. Rather, they are currently serving the ordinary deterrent part of their 
sentence, and the preventive aspect has yet to arise.95  
As in Giles, preventive detention was imposed in all three instances at the time 
of conviction by the courts. By its very nature, the preventive element of the 
detention becomes operative after the finite sentence has been served. Therefore, 
the logic of the New Zealand argument appeared to be that prisoners who have 
been sentenced to preventive detention cannot bring a claim to the Committee 
until they have started to serve the preventive part of their sentence. Not  
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surprisingly, the Committee disagreed, noting that 
[the applicants] having been sentenced to and begun to serve such sentences, will 
become effectively subject to the preventive detention regime after they have 
served … their [finite] sentence. As such, it is essentially inevitable that they will 
be exposed, after sufficient passage of time, to the particular regime, and they will 
be unable to challenge the imposition of the sentence of preventive detention upon 
them at that time.96 
Therefore, even though the New Zealand complainants had not yet begun to 
serve the preventive component of their sentences, the HRC nevertheless found 
them to be ‘victims’ due to the inevitability of their preventive detention.  
Fardon’s communication would seem to be stronger than that of the New 
Zealand complainants. This is because Fardon served and completed his finite 
sentence before the imposition of preventive detention. If the HRC was willing 
to admit the New Zealand complaint before the elapse of their finite terms of 
imprisonment,97 then the Fardon complaint, which comes after the completion of 
his finite imprisonment, appears admissible, subject to the other requirements of 
r 90 of the Rules of Procedure. 
3 The Merits 
In a 1995 report, the HRC considered the consistency of New Zealand’s 
sentencing provisions with the ICCPR, recommending the revision of the 
‘indeterminate sentence of preventive detention contained in [New Zealand’s] 
Criminal Justice Amendment Act in order to bring the Act into full consistency 
with articles 9 and 14 of the [ICCPR]’.98 In spite of this earlier comment, the 
Committee’s majority decision in the New Zealand communication made no 
specific reference to the issue of double jeopardy. The focus of the majority 
decision was on the opportunity for periodic review of preventive detention. The 
majority opinion stated:  
The Committee considers that the … authors’ detention for preventive purposes, 
that is, protection of the public, once a punitive term of imprisonment has been 
served, must be justified by compelling reasons, reviewable by a judicial 
authority, that are and remain applicable as long as detention for these purposes 
continues.99 
The Committee concluded that two of the authors ‘have not demonstrated … that 
the future operation of the sentences they have begun to serve will amount to 
arbitrary detention, contrary to article 9, once the preventive aspect of their 
sentences commences’.100 Since preventive detention had been imposed by the 
courts at the time of conviction in each of the three cases before the courts, the 
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issues of double punishment and the consistency of preventive detention with  
art 14(7) understandably did not arise. 
In the New Zealand cases, there was only one trial in each instance. In each 
case, the court considered the crimes of the accused person and passed the finite 
and preventive sentence within the context of the single trial for the crimes 
committed. This presents a fundamental difference that strengthens Fardon’s 
case. The very essence of the Fardon complaint is that unlike the cases in New 
Zealand, the preventive detention was not imposed as part of, or in the context 
of, the same criminal trial process that imposed the initial finite sentence. The 
purported preventive detention outside and independent of the initial criminal 
trial and after the completion of the finite sentence, without a finding of any new 
grounds of guilt, constitutes double punishment for the initial offence. 
In our view, the human rights issue presented to the HRC in the New Zealand 
communication was far milder than that arising from a preventive term of 
imprisonment imposed after the initial sentence has been served. As Kirby J 
noted in Fardon, the DPSOA ‘involves a later judge being required, in effect, to 
impose new punishment beyond that fixed by an earlier judge, without any 
intervening offence, trial or conviction’.101 
Thus, when the HRC considers the circumstances in Fardon’s case, it may 
well conclude that the DPSOA is a breach of art 14(7). This view is well 
supported by the approach of the minority in the New Zealand communication. 
Although double jeopardy was not raised by the communication, the minority 
rightly addressed the issue:  
it is the very principle of detention based solely on potential dangerousness that 
[we] challenge, especially as detention of this kind often carries on from, and 
becomes a mere and, it would not be going too far to say, an ‘easy’ extension of a 
penalty of imprisonment. 
While often presented as precautionary, measures of the kind in question are in 
reality penalties, and this change of their original nature constitutes a means of 
circumventing the provisions of articles 14 and 15 of the [ICCPR].102  
The minority observations represent the only HRC sentiment on double 
punishment to date. As the opinion noted, the institution of preventive detention 
offers the potential for officials who wish to evade the constraints of art 14 to do 
so. The facts in Fardon reveal that the DPSOA made this potential a reality. 
While the Explanatory Memorandum to the DPSOA presented the legislation 
in ‘precautionary’ terms, preventive detention under the DPSOA is punitive 
because it allows a judge to order the incarceration of a person who has already 
served their sentence for a criminal offence, without any further determination of 
guilt justifying the use of judicial power. This presents a breach of art 14(7).  
More disturbingly, the power of imprisonment which is ordinarily reserved 
for judicial authority in accordance with traditional judicial processes is replaced 
by legislation purporting to authorise the exercise of the judicial power of 
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imprisonment under the guise of civil commitment proceedings. This effectively 
undermines the essence of the ICCPR provision that detention and deprivation of 
liberty of the individual must be ‘on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law’.103 The HRC has noted in an earlier 
Comment that where ‘so-called preventative detention is used … it must not be 
arbitrary, and must be based on grounds and procedures established by law’.104  
In appropriate circumstances, preventive detention may be imposed by a court 
as part of criminal proceedings. A person convicted of a crime can be sentenced 
for an indeterminate period for a spectrum of reasons, including the risk that that 
person will reoffend. But in such situations, preventive detention is an integral 
element of judicial power that is fastened to the judicial process of sentencing. 
The DPSOA is unique because it allows detention not as part of the judicial 
sentencing process, but on an ex post facto basis when the judicial sentence has 
been delivered. In effect, the DPSOA allows imprisonment of the accused after 
they have served their sentence. Even more significantly, this is done without 
following the processes ordinarily required for a criminal trial. In the process, the 
DPSOA breaches not only art 14(7) of the ICCPR, but also the procedural 
requirements under art 9(1). 
V CONCLUSION 
Traditionally, a convicted felon lost all civil and proprietary rights at common 
law. As a consequence of his crime, the prisoner ‘not only forfeited his liberty, 
but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to 
him. He is for the time being the slave of the State’.105 This status led a warden 
of Kingston Penitentiary in the United States to declare that ‘so long as a convict 
is confined here I regard him as dead to all transactions of the outer world’.106 
Such were the views on the status of prisoners in the 19th century. We have a 
come a long way since then. The modern view has been articulated by Justice 
Brennan of the US Supreme Court: a prisoner is entitled ‘to treatment as a 
“person” for purposes of due process of law ... A prisoner remains a member of 
the human family … His punishment is not irrevocable’.107 Contemporary 
international human rights standards reinforce this view. 
This commentary has argued that the continued incarceration under the 
DPSOA of a prisoner who has already served the initial sentence is a breach of 
the ICCPR provisions governing double punishment and due process. The High 
Court’s decision rejecting the punitive character of the DPSOA’s preventive 
detention scheme is one more unfortunate addition to the list of decisions that 
affirm the validity of Australian legislation and appear inconsistent with the 
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ICCPR.108 Nevertheless, the First Optional Protocol appears to provide an 
avenue for redress for Fardon.  
There is no doubt that the issues before the HRC will primarily turn on 
whether preventive detention is found to be punitive in nature. In our opinion, 
whereas preventive detention has generally been imposed by states as an integral 
part of the judicial process at the time of sentencing, detention under the DPSOA 
scheme — imposed after the completion of and independent to the initial 
sentence — is punitive. Although the High Court may have affirmed the legal 
validity of the DPSOA in Australia, its decision in Fardon is unlikely to remain 
the last word. 
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